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Abstract—Dual-function radar-communication (DFRC) based
on frequency hopping (FH) MIMO radar (FH-MIMO DFRC)
achieves symbol rate much higher than radar pulse repetition
frequency. Such DFRC, however, is prone to eavesdropping due
to the spatially uniform illumination of FH-MIMO radar. How
to enhance the physical layer security of FH-MIMO DFRC is
vital yet unsolved. In this paper, we reveal the potential of
using permutations of hopping frequencies to achieve secure
and high-speed FH-MIMO DFRC. Detecting permutations at
a communication user is challenging due to the dependence
on spatial angle. We propose a series of baseband waveform
processing methods which address the challenge specifically for
the legitimate user (Bob) and meanwhile scrambles constellations
almost omnidirectionally. We discover a deterministic sign rule
from the signals processed by the proposed methods. Based
on the rule, we develop accurate algorithms for information
decoding at Bob. Confirmed by simulation, our design achieves
substantially high physical layer security for FH-MIMO DFRC,
improves decoding performance compared with existing designs
and reduces mutual interference among radar targets.
Index Terms—DFRC, FH-MIMO radar, physical layer secu-
rity, hopping frequency permutation
I. INTRODUCTION
There have been increasing demands for systems with joint
communications and radar sensing capabilities, on vehicu-
lar platforms such as unmanned aerial vehicles and smart
cars [1]. Performing the two functions on one platform by
sharing hardware and signal processing modules can achieve
immediate benefits of reduced cost, size, weight, and better
spectral efficiency [2]. As pointed out in [3], co-designing
joint communication and radar sensing can maximize spectral
efficiency with the two sub-systems benefiting each other. Tar-
geting at co-design, some researchers optimize dual-function
waveform by jointly considering communication and radar
sensing performance metrics (e.g., mutual information and
achievable rate etc.), leading to an inherent performance trade-
off between the two sub-systems [4]–[6]. Some researchers
exploit the ubiquitous wireless communication technologies,
e.g., IEEE 802.11p [7], IEEE 802.11ad [8]–[10] and mobile
communication network [11], to perform radar sensing. These
design [4]–[12], however, can have constrained radar sensing
ability, as compared with using dedicated radar waveforms.
Integrating secondary data communications in existing
radar waveform/platforms, referred to as dual-function radar-
communication (DFRC) [13], [14], puts radar sensing first.
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MIMO radar has gained popularity in DFRC given its degrees
of freedom in both angle and waveform domains [15]–[19].
Conventional modulations, such as phase shift keying (PSK)
and amplitude shift keying, are performed in [15], [16] using
the sidelobes of beam pattern. Non-traditional modulations,
such as waveform shuffling [17] and code shift keying [18],
have also been developed by optimizing MIMO radar wave-
form. These works [15]–[18] generally embed one symbol per
one or multiple radar pulses; hence the communication symbol
rate is limited by the pulse repetition frequency (PRF).
Employing frequency-hopping (FH) based MIMO (FH-
MIMO) radar can increase the symbol rate to much higher than
radar PRF, since information embedding can be performed on
basis of fast-time sub-pulse [20]–[22]. Hereafter, we refer to
FH-MIMO radar-based DFRC as FH-MIMO DFRC. In [20],
[21], PSK-based FH-MIMO DFRC is developed by adding
PSK phases onto FH-MIMO radar waveform. In [22], different
combinations of hopping frequencies are used as constellation
points and selected per radar hop (aka sub-pulse within a
radar pulse) based on information bits to be transmitted,
hence referred to as hopping frequency combination selec-
tion (HFCS). HFCS decoding can be readily performed by
identifying hopping frequencies in the frequency domain. As
illustrated in [22], HFCS greatly increases the data rate of
FH-MIMO DFRC compared with PSK [21].
However, HFCS-based FH-MIMO DFRC has a low physical
layer security which can hinder its effective application. FH-
MIMO radar radiates signals uniformly in the spatial region of
interest [23]. Thus, any user covered by radar illumination, al-
beit the angle-of-departure (AoD) with respect to (w.r.t.) radar,
can correctly identify hopping frequencies to eavesdrop HFCS
bits. The detection probability of hopping frequencies is in-
dependent of AoD given the same signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
(which will be detailed in Section II-C). In fact, eavesdropper
(Eve), generally having high receiver gain and sensitivity [24],
can correctly identify the hopping frequencies with a higher
probability compared with a legitimate user.
On the other hand, solely using HFCS has not fully
exploited the information embedding capability of hopping
frequencies. Given any M hopping frequencies, there are
M ! number of permutations, each providing a unique pairing
between hopping frequencies and antennas. Thus, in addition
to HFCS [22], performing hopping frequency permutation se-
lection (HFPS) at radar and detecting HFPS have the potential
of boosting the data rate of FH-MIMO DFRC. Unlike HFCS
relying on amplitude/power to identify hopping frequencies,
HFPS decoding needs to extract signal phases to estimate
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Fig. 1. System block diagram of an FH-MIMO DFRC, where radar, besides detecting targets, also performs downlink communication through an LoS link
with a legitimate user named Bob. Meanwhile, there is an unintended user Eve who eavesdrops on the communication between radar and Bob. The proposed
baseband waveform processing highlighted on the left ensures a secure communication by scrambling constellations omnidirectionally. The proposed decoding
scheme, as highlighted on the right, can recover constellations at Bob to achieve high-speed data communications.
hopping frequency permutation. This poses a challenging
AoD-dependent issue, as will be detailed in Section III-A.
In this paper, we design new baseband waveform processing
to jointly perform HFCS and HFPS in FH-MIMO DFRC,
achieving secure and high-speed data communications solely
between radar and legitimate user (Bob). We reveal that,
besides improving data rate, using HFPS has the substantial
potential of enhancing physical layer security for FH-MIMO
DFRC. Our key contributions are summarized as follows.
1) Through formulating HFPS decoding problem, we ana-
lyze the AoD-dependent issue and accordingly propose
an element-wise phase compensation (EPC), removing
the AoD dependence of HFPS decoding specifically for
Bob. EPC poses a new challenge to Eve by incapacitating
HFPS decoding at Eve if not knowing the AoD of Bob;
2) Considering the possible acquisition of the AoD of Bob
by Eve, we propose a random sign reversal (RSR) pro-
cessing which scrambles constellations almost omnidirec-
tionally. We prove that RSR can force the symbol error
rate (SER) of Eve into converging to one asymptotically;
3) We discover a deterministic rule related to the signs and
phases of the signals processed by EPC and RSR. Based
on the rule, we develop an algorithm for Bob to accurately
detect and remove RSR. Enabled by EPC, we also design
an algorithm for Bob to efficiently decode HFPS.
We provide a detailed numerical example to demonstrate the
overall workflow of incorporating the proposed design in an
FH-MIMO DFRC system. We also provide extensive simula-
tions, showing that our design achieves a substantially high
communication secrecy and an improved SER performance
compared with previous works. As also revealed in simulation,
the proposed design suppresses sidelobe spikes in the range
ambiguity function of FH-MIMO radar, which hence greatly
improves signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) of radar detection.
Notations: The following notations are used throughout
the paper. CKM denotes binomial coefficient and M ! denotes
M factorial. ⌊·⌋ rounds towards negative infinity. (·)T takes
transpose and (·)∗ takes conjugate. ‖ ·‖2 denotes ℓ2-norm. [·]x
takes element x of a vector and [·]x,y takes an element from a
matrix at row x and column y. ⊙ denotes elementwise product.
ℜ{x} take the real part of x. P{x = x0} gives the probability
of a random variable x taking x0. E{·} takes expectation.
erfc{·} denotes the complementary error function. 1x is an
x-dimensional unit vector and 0x×y denotes an x × y matrix
of zeros.
II. SIGNAL MODELS AND SUMMARY OF OUR DESIGN
In this section, the system structure and signal model of
FH-MIMO DFRC are presented. Fig. 1 illustrates the overall
system block diagram. The system consists of an FH-MIMO
radar, a single-antenna communication user called Bob and a
potential eavesdropper called Eve. The radar is equipped with
co-located uniform linear arrays as transmitter and receiver.
In addition to target detection, the radar also performs down-
link data transmission to Bob through an line-of-sight (LoS)
channel. In this paper, we focus on developing information
embedding and decoding schemes to realize secure and high-
speed communications between radar and Bob. Thus, we
assume that the channel parameters of Bob are available at
radar. Also, we consider a practical scenario that the channel
information of Eve is unknown to either radar or Bob.
A. FH-MIMO Radar
Assume that the radar has M transmitter antennas and N
receiver antennas. Each radar pulse is divided into H sub-
pulses, i.e., hops. Each hop has the time duration of T . The
radar frequency band with bandwidth B is divided evenly into
K sub-bands. The k-th (k = 0, 1, · · · ,K − 1) sub-band has
the baseband central frequency kB/K . At hop h and antenna
m, the FH-MIMO radar-transmitted signal is
shm(t) = e
j2π
khmB
K t, 0 ≤ t− hT ≤ T, (1)
where khm is the index of the sub-band selected for antenna
m at hop h. To ensure waveform orthogonality, the following
constraints are imposed on radar parameters [20], [22], [25]
khm 6= khm′ ∀m 6= m′, BT/K = r(≥ 1), (2)
where r denotes a constant integer.
B. Signal Model of Bob
Denote the AoD of the LoS path between radar and Bob as
φ and the complex channel gain of the path as β. Each hop of
signals received at Bob are sampled into L digital samples by
the sampling frequency of 2B. Based on (1), the i-th baseband
signal sample received at Bob is given by
yh(i) = β
M−1∑
m=0
e−jmuφej2πrikhm/L + ξ(i), (3)
where uφ =
2πd sinφ
λ is referred to as beamspace AoD and
ξ(i) is additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). Here, d is the
3antenna spacing of the radar transmitter array and λ is the
radar wavelength. Taking the L-point DFT of yh(i), the result
at the l-th discrete frequency is
Yh(l) = β
M−1∑
m=0
e−jmuφδ
(
l − rkhm
)
+ Ξ(l) (4)
where δ(l) is the Dirac delta function and Ξ(l) is the DFT
of ξ(i), i.e., Ξ(l) = 1L
∑i=L−1
i=0 ξ(i)e
j 2piliL ∀l. See Appendix A
for the intermediate calculations of (4).
According to the waveform orthogonality imposed by (2),
there are M different hopping frequencies per hop, which
leads to M non-zero values of the Dirac delta function in
(4). Therefore, by detecting M peaks in |Yh(l)|, the hopping
frequencies used at hop h can be identified. Let l∗m (m =
0, 1, · · · ,M−1) denote the index of the m-th peak of |Yh(l)|,
satisfying
l∗0 < l
∗
1 < · · · < l∗M−1. (5)
The M hopping frequencies corresponding to the M peaks
can be collected by the following set Kh,
Kh =
{
l∗0/r, l
∗
1/r, · · · , l∗M−1/r
}
. (6)
Note that Kh is a combination of taking M out of K hopping
frequencies. The combinations are used as constellation points
in [22], where the hopping frequencies per hop are selected
at radar based on information bits; and by detecting Kh at
communication receiver, information is decoded.
C. Signal Model of Eve
As FH-MIMO radar transmits signals omnidirectionally,
Eve can receive and process radar signals as Bob does.
Consider that Eve also takes an L-point DFT per hop. Let
θ denote the AoD of Eve, α the channel gain and Xh(l) the
DFT result at the l-th discrete frequency. With reference to (3)
and (4), we can express Xh(l) as
Xh(l) = α
M−1∑
m=0
e−jmuθδ
(
l − rkhm
)
+ Z(l), (7)
where uθ =
2πd sin θ
λ denotes the beamspace AoD of the LoS
path between radar and Eve, and Z(l) is AWGN at Eve.
Comparing (4) and (7), we see that the Dirac delta function
takes non-zero values at the same discrete frequencies, i.e., at
l∗m ∀m given in (5). Without noise, the amplitudes of non-
zero |Yh(l)| and |Xh(l)| are |β| and |α|, respectively. Clearly,
the power of useful signals received at Bob and Eve are
independent of their LoS AoDs w.r.t. radar. That is, Kh can
be readily identified at Eve as described in Section II-B for
Bob. In fact, due to potentially larger antenna gain [24], Eve
can have a higher detection probability of Kh, compared with
Bob. This elaborates the low physical layer security of solely
using Kh for FH-MIMO DFRC, as pointed out in Section I.
D. Overall Description of Proposed Methods
To achieve a secure and high-speed FH-MIMO DFRC, we
propose new baseband waveform processing, as illustrated in
Fig. 1. There are four modules in the proposed processing,
including HFCS, HFPS, EPC and RSR. Below, we illustrate
the first two in details, and then provide the motivations
of developing the remaining two modules (which will be
presented in subsequent sections).
Besides combinations of hopping frequencies, we also use
the permutation of hopping frequencies to convey information
bits. Referring to Fig. 1, we divide each communication
symbol into two sub-symbols. One is used for HFCS which
selects one out of CMK combinations of hopping frequen-
cies for a radar hop. Given M hopping frequencies there are
M ! permutations of the frequencies, each providing a pairing
between hopping frequencies and antennas. Thus, we use the
second sub-symbol to perform HFPS.
A straightforward benefit of introducing HFPS is the in-
creased data rate given the large number of permutations.
Given M antennas and K sub-bands, the number of infor-
mation bits can be conveyed by HFCS and HFPS are up
to ⌊log2 CKM⌋ and ⌊log2(M !)⌋, respectively. Taking K = 20
and M = 12 for example, we have ⌊log2 CKM⌋ = 16 and
⌊log2(M !)⌋ = 28. That is, combining HFCS with HFPS can
transmit 28 more bits per radar hop than solely using HFCS
as designed in [22].
However, this potential of HFPS is non-trivial to fulfill, due
to a challenging AoD-dependent issue in decoding HFPS, as
will be illustrated in Section III-A. To solve the issue, we
devise an EPC processing, based on which an algorithm is
designed for Bob to efficiently decode HFPS sub-symbol.
This will be elaborated on in Section III-B. Due to EPC,
HFPS decoding at Eve relies on not only her own AoD but
also that of Bob. Therefore, combining HFPS and EPC can
potentially enhance the physical layer security of FH-MIMO
DFRC, particularly when Eve does not know the AoD of Bob.
This will be unveiled in Section III-C.
Considering that a powerful Eve can manage to acquire the
AoD of Bob, the secrecy enhanced by EPC is then limited. To
address this issue, we further propose RSR processing on radar
baseband waveform, which severely scrambles constellations
almost omnidirectionally. The enhanced secrecy protection
against Eve is analyzed in Section IV-A. Through investigating
the phase changes of the signals processed by EPC and RSR,
we discover a deterministic rule to detect and remove RSR
for Bob. This will be presented in Section IV-B. In addition,
the impact of all the proposed designs on radar detection will
be analyzed in Section IV-C. An exemplary FH-MIMO DFRC
integrating our design will be presented in Section V.
III. ELEMENT-WISE PHASE COMPENSATION
In this section, the proposed EPC is presented. Through the
elaboration of the AoD-dependent issue in HFPS decoding,
we develop EPC processing. Then, the potential of using EPC
to enhance physical layer security is unveiled.
4A. AoD-Dependence Issue of HFPS Decoding
To show the AoD dependence of detecting HFPS, i.e., kh,
we first formulate the detection problem. By multiplying Yh(l)
given in (4) with β∗, the remaining exponential term e−jmuφ
attached to the l∗m-th peak is them-th element of the following
steering vector
aφ = [1, e
−juφ , · · · , e−j(M−1)uφ ]T. (8)
Stacking the L peaks of Yh(l) into a vector, we have
yh = [Yh(l
∗
0), Yh(l
∗
1), · · · , Yh(l∗M−1)]T.
Based on (4) and (5), we see that yh is a permutation of the
β-scaled aφ, i.e.,
yh = βPhaφ + v, (9)
where Ph is permutation matrix and v collectsM independent
noises Ξ(l∗m) ∀m. Multiplying PTh to both sides of (9) gives
PThyh = βP
T
hPhaφ +P
T
hv = βaφ +P
T
hv, (10)
where PThPh = I is due to the orthogonal property of a
permutation matrix. By comparing the two sides of (10) in
a pointwise manner, the hopping frequencies attached to the
M antennas can be expressed as
kh = P
T
h [l
∗
0/r, l
∗
1/r, · · · , l∗M−1/r]T. (11)
Eq. (11) indicates that HFPS decoding can be performed by
identifying the permutation matrix Ph.
According to (10), the following detector can be formulated
to identify Ph,
Ph : min
P∈P
g(P) s.t. g(P) = ‖βaφ −PTyh‖22, (12)
where P is the set of possible permutation matrices. From (12),
we see that the detecting performance of Ph varies with the
AoD of Bob, i.e., φ. This leads to the so-called AoD-dependent
issue of HFPS decoding. In particular, given a small φ, the
distance between adjacent elements in aφ is also small, leading
to a high error probability of detectingPh and decoding HFPS.
This issue can be relieved with a large φ. However, a large φ
can lead to an ambiguity issue. When uφ >
2π
M , it can happen
that the phases of e−jmuφ at two or more different values of
m are identical.
B. EPC and HFPS Decoding at Bob
We see from (8) the elements of aφ are similar to the
constellation points of the M -PSK modulation. Thus, when
e−jmuφ ∀m are uniformly distributed on the unit circle, the
best detecting performance can be achieved [17]. In light
of this, we introduce EPC to compensate the phase of each
antenna-transmitted signal so that aφ given in (8) becomes the
following AoD-independent steering vector
a = [1, e−j2π/M , · · · , e−j2π(M−1)/M ]T. (13)
Based on (1), (3) and (4), the following EPC is introduced for
the m-th antenna at hop h,
s˜hm = shm(t)e
−jm(2π/M−uφ). (14)
Algorithm 1 HFPS Decoding at Bob
1: Input: y˜h, β, l
∗
m(∀m) and r (given in (2));
2: Take the element angles of β∗y˜h, and stack them ~ω;
3: At ∀m, if [~ω]m > 0, [~ω]m = [~ω]m − 2π;
4: Sorting the elements of ~ω in descending order gives i;
5: If ‖ej[~ω][i]M−1 − 1‖2 < ‖ej[~ω][i]0 − 1‖2, shift i circularly by
a single element; ⊲ Similar to “circshift()” in MATLAB;
6: Substitute i into (15) to construct Ph;
7: Substituting Ph, l
∗
m and r into (11) leads to kh;
8: Look up kh in the constellation set to decode HFPS.
We add a tilde sign above the relevant variables to reflect the
impact of EPC. That is, yh(l), Yh(l), yh and g(P), as given in
(3), (4), (9) and (12), respectively, are now denoted by y˜h(l),
Y˜h(l), y˜h and g˜(P). Note that
• y˜h(l) has the same expression as yh(l) except that uφ is
replaced by 2π/M . The same goes for Y˜h(l);
• y˜h replaces aφ in (9) with a given in (13). The same
permutation matrix is applicable for both y˜h and yh,
since EPC does not change the indexes of peaks in Y˜h(l);
refer to Section II-C.
Jointly considering the above changes caused by EPC, the
objective function of problem (12) becomes g˜(P) = ‖βa −
PTy˜h‖22. Expanding the objective function g˜(P) gives
g˜(P) = ‖βa‖22 + ‖y˜h‖22 − 2ℜ
{
β∗aHPTy˜h
}
.
We see that minimizing g˜(P) is equivalent to maximizing
ℜ{β∗aHPTy˜h} w.r.t. P, as the other two terms are irrelevant
to P. The maximization is achieved when the pointwise phase
difference between a and β∗PTy˜h is minimized. Due to EPC,
the element phases of a are in descending order for sure. This
implies that the correct P needs to sort the element phases of
β∗PTh y˜h in descending order as well. Let the M × 1 vector i
collects the arrangements of the element phases of β∗y˜h into
the sorted version. We propose the following solution to (12),
[Ph][i]m,m = 1 (m = 0, 1, · · · ,M − 1) (15)
where Ph is initialized as 0M×M .
Based on the above analysis, Algorithm 1 is established to
decode HFPS at Bob. In Step 2, directly taking the element
angles makes the values in ~ω fall in the region of [−π, π].
Thus, Step 3 recovers true angles by compensating −2π on
elements larger than 0. This is because all the element angles
of β∗y˜h should be equal to those of a given in (13) in the
absence of noise, and taking angle in Step 2 adds 2π onto
any angle smaller than −π. Corrupted in noises, the phase
of [β∗y˜h]0 (which is zero without noise) can become a small
positive value which will then be revised through Step 3 into a
small negative value close to −2π. This phenomenon, known
as zigzag [26], turns the largest element angle of β∗y˜h into the
smallest one. Step 5 is introduced to remove potential zigzag
by comparing the Euclidean distances ‖ej[~ω][i]M−1 − 1‖2 and
‖ej[~ω][i]0 −1‖2. Based on (11) and (15), Steps 6 and 7 produce
kh which is finally used for HFPS decoding in Step 8.
5C. Enhancing Physical Layer Security by EPC
As the phase compensation of EPC is determined based
on the AoD of Bob, the received signal at Eve is still AoD-
dependent. To this end, we can conclude that EPC helps
enhance the physical layer security of FH-MIMO DFRC.
Taking into account EPC in the frequency-domain signal
received at Eve, i.e., Xh(l) given in (7), the signal can be
rewritten into
X˜h(l) = α
M−1∑
m=0
e−jm(
2pi
M +uθ−uφ)δ
(
l − rkhm
)
+ Z(l). (16)
Again, we notice that detecting the set of hopping frequencies,
i.e., Kh, at Eve is not affected by AoD. The same set {l∗m ∀m}
given in (6) can be identified at Eve as that obtained at Bob.
Similar to yh given in (9), the following vector can be obtained
at Eve,
x˜h = [X˜h(l
∗
0), X˜h(l
∗
1), · · · , X˜h(l∗M−1)]T. (17)
With reference to (10)∼(12), the following detector is formu-
lated at Eve to decode HFPS by identifying the permutation
matrix Ph,
Ph : min
P∈PEve
f(P) (18)
s.t. f(P) =
{ ‖αaθφ −PTx˜h‖22, if Eve knows uφ
‖αaθ −PTx˜h‖22, otherwise ,
where the two steering vectors are
aθφ = [1, e
−j( 2piM +uθ−uφ), · · · , e−j(M−1)( 2piM +uθ−uφ)]T and
aθ = [1, e
−j( 2piM +uθ), · · · , e−j(M−1)( 2piM +uθ)]T.
Note that the same Ph is required for Eve and Bob to decode
HFPS, since Ph is added at radar as part of the waveform.
From (18), we see that EPC makes decoding HFPS at Eve
relies on not only the AoD of Eve uθ but also that of Bob
uφ. If uφ is unknown to Eve, the decoding performance can
degrade drastically, since the actual steering vector contained
in x˜h is aθφ. A powerful eavesdropper may manage to know
uφ, reducing the secrecy enhancement brought by EPC. This
can be solved by a new technique proposed below.
IV. RANDOM SIGN REVERSAL
To further enhance the secrecy of FH-MIMO DFRC, we
introduce RSR to scramble the constellations received by Eve,
even when the AoD of Bob is known to Eve. As indicated by
the name, RSR randomly selects several antennas and reverse
the signs of signals transmitted by them. Antennas are ran-
domly and independently selected over hops. In this section,
we first explain how RSR can scramble constellations received
by Eve, and then develop an algorithm for Bob to remove RSR.
We also elaborate the impact of all proposed modules on radar
performance. In the following, we add a breve sign above
relevant variables to indicate RSR processing, e.g., s˘hm(t)
corresponding to the EPC-processed s˜hm(t) given in (14) and
the original radar waveform shm(t) given in (3).
Fig. 2. Histogram of simulated fℜ
b
(P) and the analytical PDF based on the
parameters derived in Proposition 1, where uθφ = 0, M = 8 and Q = 2.
A. Impact of RSR on Eve
We can reflect RSR in radar-transmitted signals by adding
a binary coefficient bhm onto s˜hm(t) given in (14), leading to
s˘hm(t) = bhms˜hm(t) = bhmshm(t)e
−jm(2π/M−uφ). (19)
Denoting the number of sign-reversed antennas as Q per hop,
we have
P{bhm = 1} = (M −Q)/M ; P{bhm = −1} = Q/M, (20)
where P takes probability. Substituting (19) into (16) and (17),
we can rewrite x˜h into
x˘h = αPh
(
bh ⊙ aθφ
)
+ z, (21)
where ⊙ denotes pointwise product and z collects Z(l∗m) ∀m.
Replacing x˜h in (18) with x˘h, the objective function,
denoted by fb(P) (with the subscript added to reflect the
impact of RSR), becomes
fb(P) = ‖αaθφ − αPTPh
(
bh ⊙ aθφ
)−PTz‖22
= 2M |α|2 + z˜ − 2|α|2ℜ{aHθφPTPh(bh ⊙ aθφ)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
fℜb (P)
(22)
where ‖aθφ‖22 = M and ‖PTPh
(
bh ⊙ aθφ
)‖22 = M are
plugged in, and z˜ is the sum of noise-related terms. It can
be readily confirmed that the variance of z˜ is independent
of P and bh. Without RSR, i.e., bh = 1 in (22), f
ℜ
b (P) is
maximized at P = Ph, which then minimizes fb(P) without
noise. However, affected by RSR, fb(P) can no longer be
maximized at P = Ph, as detailed in the following.
Proposition 1: Within the following angular region
0 ≤ uθφ ≤ 2π(M − 2)
M
, s.t. uθφ = uθ − uφ, (23)
the proposed RSR makes fℜb (P) approach a normal distri-
bution with parameters given in (24), which further forces
the SER of Eve, who solves (18) for HFPS decoding, into
converging to one in high SNR regions.
µf =
M − 2Q
M2
sin2
(
M(uθφ+
2pi
M )
2
)
sin2
(
(uθφ+
2pi
M )
2
) , σ2f = 12(M − µ2f ) (24)
Refer to Appendix B for the proof of Proposition 1. Fig. 2
plots the histogram of the simulated fℜb (P) with the analytical
PDF plotted based on the parameters derived in Proposition
1. We see that, as proved, fℜb (P) conforms to a normal
distribution. We also see that the analytical PDF of fℜb (P)
overlaps with the simulated one, which confirms the accuracy
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Fig. 3. The mean and variance of fℜ
b
(P) vs uθφ with M = 12 and Q = 2.
of the parameters derived in Proposition 1. Given M = 8
and Q = 2 in Fig. 2, we have fℜb (Ph) = 4. Seen from the
figure, there are a non-negligible number of P(6= Ph) leading
to fℜb (P) > f
ℜ
b (Ph). In this case, solving (18) returns the P
in the region of fℜb (P) > 4 (as annotated in Fig. 2) rather
than Ph required by Eve for HFPS decoding.
Fig. 3 compares the simulated and analytical parameters of
fℜb (P) against uθφ. We see that the analytical µf given in (24)
depicts the mean of fℜb (P) accurately over the whole angular
region, and the analytical σ2f is accurate for most angles. An
exceptional angular region where the analytical and simulated
values of σ2f have a non-negligible gap is around uθφ = π− 2πM .
In this region, the complex fℜb (P) has much smaller imaginary
parts (compared with real parts) and even turns into a real
value at uθφ = π − 2πM ; see (22). Since we take half the
variance of fb(P) as that of its real part f
ℜ
b (P) (see (37) in
Appendix B), the actual variance of fℜb (P) is larger than σ
2
f
given in (24) when uθφ is close to π − 2πM and doubles σ2f at
uθφ = π − 2πM . In fact, this exception is favorable to improve
communication secrecy. As seen in Fig. 2, a larger variance of
fℜb (P) increases the number of permutation matrices causing
incorrect HFPS decoding at Eve.
Note that, although the region
2π(M−2)
M ≤ uθφ ≤ 2π,
denoted by R, is excluded in Proposition 1; seen from the
zoomed-in sub-figure in Fig. 3, the analytical σ2f derived
in the proposition can depict the actual variance in part of
R. (The reason for excluding R is illustrated at the end of
Appendix B.) The decoding performance of Eve is low in R,
as explained below. We see from Fig. 3 that R can be divided
into two sub-regions, denoted by R1 andR2, with σ2f > 0 and
σ2f ≅ 0, respectively. In R1, since σ2f > 0, the conclusion in
Proposition 1 still holds, i.e., the normally distributed fℜb (P)
leads to the asymptotic convergence of the SER at Eve. In R2,
due to uθφ +
2π
M ≅ 2π, we have aθφ ≅ 1M , which degrades
the decoding performance of Eve and even invalidates (18) at
uθφ +
2π
M = 2π.
B. Detecting RSR at Bob
Enabled by EPC, Bob can recover RSR-scrambled constel-
lations, which is developed in this subsection. Similar to (21),
EPC and RSR turn yh given in (9) into
y˘h = βPha˘+ v, s.t. a˘ =
(
bh ⊙ a
)
(25)
where a is given in (13) and v collects the AWGNs Ξ(l∗m) ∀m
given in (4). We discover a deterministic rule concerning the
Algorithm 2 Removing RSR for Bob
1: Input: Q, M and y˘h; ⊲ | · |2 takes element-wise absolute square
2: Calculate Yh = |y˘h1T − 1y˘Th |2;
3: Identify the minimum element (excluding diagonal ele-
ment) and its index in each row of Yh, stacking them in
ymin and d, respectively;
4: Sort ymin in ascending order and denote the index vector
from ymin to the sorted version as d1;
5: for q = 0 : Q− 1 do ⊲ Index starts from 0.
6: Take i = [d1]q and i
′ = [d]i. Remove i′ from d1;
7: [yh]i∗ = −[yh]i∗ , s.t. i∗ = mini,i′
{
L−l∗i
r
,
L−l∗
i′
r
}
;
8: end for
9: Return y˜h = y˘h.
element signs and phases of a˘ — the joint processing of EPC
and RSR turns the m-th element into another one in a˘. By
assuming bhm = −1, [a˘]m becomes
[a˘]m = −e−j 2pimM = ej
2piM/2
M e−j
2pim
M = [a˘]m±M2 , (26)
where m± M2 depends on m ≶ M2 .
The discovered rule enables us to detect RSR by identifying
identical elements in a˘. However, to ensure correct detection of
RSR, two constraints are necessary. First, when bhm = −1 and
bh(m+M2 )
= −1 happen simultaneously, RSR turns [a˘]m and
[a˘]m+M2
into each other. In this case, two reversed antennas
will be identified as a single one. To avoid this, we impose the
constraint that bhm = −1 and bh(m+M2 ) = −1 cannot happen
simultaneously, i.e.,
bhm + bh(m+M/2) 6= −2 ∀m < M/2. (27)
Second, both bhm = −1 and bh(m+M2 ) = −1 lead to
[a˘]m = [a˘]m+M2
. In turn, [a˘]m = [a˘]m+M2
can be caused by
either bhm = −1 or bh(m+M2 ) = −1, incurring ambiguity in
RSR detection. To remove the ambiguity, we need to enforce
a protocol between radar and Bob that RSR only happens
on the antenna associated with smaller (or larger) hopping
frequencies. This constraint can be expressed as
bhm∗ = −1 s.t. m∗ : min
m,m+M/2
{khm, kh(m+M/2)}. (28)
Algorithm 2 is designed to remove RSR for Bob based on
y˘h given in (25). In Step 2, the power differences between each
element in yh and all the other elements are calculated. After
Steps 3 and 4, the first several elements in d1 are related to
the indexes of RSR antennas. In Step 6, the indexes of the two
antennas, whose received signals are most similar in power, are
extracted. By comparing the associated hopping frequencies,
RSR is detected with the aid of constraint (28) and removed
by reversing back the sign; see Step 7. It is noteworthy that the
removal of RSR at Bob also owes to EPC that only works for
Bob (due to the AoD-specific design of EPC). This indicates
that Eve cannot remove RSR as Bob does in Algorithm 2.
C. Impact of Proposed Design on Radar Performance
Subsequently, we illustrate the impact of each module in the
proposed baseband waveform processing on radar performance
7TABLE I
DIFFERENT FH SEQUENCES
(h,m) (0, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) (1,1)
C1 fhm (MHz) 20 10 45 30
C2 f˜hm (MHz) 10 20 30 45
TABLE II
COMBINATIONS OF
(
ν, fh′m′
)
, WHERE THE FREQUENCY IS IN MHZ
(m,m′) (0, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 1)
(h, h′) (0, 1)(
ν, fh′m′
)
, C1 (−20, 30) (−35, 45) (−10, 30) (−25, 45)(
ν˜, f˜h′m′
)
, C2 (−25, 45) (−10, 30) (−35, 45) (−20, 30)
using the range ambiguity function. Consider an FH-MIMO
radar with M antennas and H hops per pulse. Let τ denote
time delay. Based on [25, Eq. (27)], we can express the range
ambiguity function of the radar as,
R(τ) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
M−1∑
m=0
M−1∑
m′=0
H−1∑
h,h′=0
χ(τ˜ , ν)ej2πνhT︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
ej2πfh′m′τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
∣∣∣∣∣∣ , (29)
where τ˜ = τ − T (h′ − h), ν = fhm − fh′m′ and χ(x, y) is
the ambiguity function of a standard rectangular pulse with
x and y spanning range and Doppler domains, respectively.
According to [25, Eq. (26)], we have
χ(x, y) =
(
T − |x|
)
S
(
y
(
T − |x|))ejπy(x+T ), if |x| < T ;
and otherwise χ(x, y) = 0, where S(α) = sin(πα)πα . The impact
of proposed processing on R(τ) is analyzed below.
1) Impact of HFCS on R(τ): HFCS selects M out of K
different hopping frequency per hop based on varying infor-
mation bits to be transmitted. The waveform orthogonality
condition given in (2) is hence always satisfied under HFCS
processing. As conventional FH-MIMO radars randomly se-
lects hopping frequencies [25], HFCS, resembling the random
selection, incurs negligible changes to the key features of
R(τ), e.g., mainlobe width and mainlobe-to-sidelobe ratio etc.
2) Impact of HFPS on R(τ): We see from (29) that R(τ)
is determined by the combinations of (B,D) which is in
essence relied on the combinations of (ν, fh′m′). By fixing
fh′m′ , the combinations of (ν, fh′m′) remain the same despite
the ordering of the hopping frequencies at hop h. The same
conclusion holds by fixing fhm and randomly changing the
ordering of the hopping frequencies at hop h′. This is validated
by the example given in Tables I and II, where, C1 and C2 in
Table I give two orderings of the same hopping frequencies,
and, clearly, the overall combination set of
(
ν, fh′m′
)
obtained
under C1 is identical to that of
(
ν˜, f˜h′m′
)
under C2. Therefore,
we can claim that HFPS does not incur any change to R(τ)
after hopping frequencies are selected by HFCS.
3) Impact of EPC and RSR on R(τ): According to (14)
and (25), the joint impact of EPC and RSR is that the phases
of radar-transmitted signals are randomly modulated across
antennas and hops. As analyzed in [20], PSK modulations can
prevent periodic coherent accumulation (which occurs when-
ever τ is integer times of a hop duration), hence suppressing
periodic sidelobe spikes of Rτ . Given the equivalence between
the impact of EPC and RSR on radar signals and that of PSK
[20], we conclude that EPC and RSR can suppress periodic
sidelobe spikes of R(τ). A benefit of the suppression is the
reduced mutual interference among radar targets. This will be
validated in Section VI.
V. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION OF THE PROPOSED DESIGN
Having introduced each module in the proposed waveform
processing (refer to Fig. 1), we provide a numerical example
to demonstrate the overall workflow of incorporating the pro-
posed design in an FH-MIMO DFRC system. For illustration
convenience but without loss of generality, small values of
parameters are taken: M = 4, K = 5 and Q = 1. The task
here is: transmit symbol e = [01 0011]T to Bob at hop h.
I) Initialization: According to Section II-D, the number of
bits able to be conveyed by HFCS is E1 = ⌊log2 CKM⌋ = 2
and that by HFPS is E2 = ⌊log2(M !)⌋ = 4. Thus, each radar
hop can transmit E = E1 + E2 = 6 bits. Out of C
K
M = 5
different combinations, 2E1 = 4 combinations are selected as
HFCS constellation points and collected by C1. We take C1 as{
[C1]0 = {0, 1, 2, 3}, [C1]1 = {0, 1, 2, 4},
[C1]2 = {0, 1, 3, 4}, [C1]3 = {0, 2, 3, 4}
}
,
where [C1]i denotes the i-th constellation point in C1. Out of
M ! = 16 permutations of hopping frequencies, 2E2 = 16
permutations are selected as HFPS constellation points and
collected by C2, as given by
[C2]0 = {3, 2, 1, 0}, [C2]1 = {3, 2, 0, 1},
[C2]2 = {3, 1, 2, 0}, [C2]3 = {3, 1, 0, 2},
· · · · · ·
 .
II) HFCS and HFPS: The first E1(= 2) bits of e are used
to perform HFCS. Since (01)D = 1, [C1]1 = {0, 1, 2, 4} is
selected as the set of hopping frequencies, i.e., the zero-th,
first, second and fourth sub-bands are used for radar transmis-
sion at hop h. Afterwards, (·)D gives the decimal value of the
enclosed bit sequence. Then, the last E2(= 4) bits of e are
used for HFPS. Since (0011)D = 3, [C2]3 = {3, 1, 0, 2} is
selected to pair hopping frequencies with antennas. The first
element in [C2]3 is 3, which indicates that the 3rd element in
[C1]1 is used for antenna m = 0, i.e., kh0 = 4. (Here, index
starts from 0.) Accordingly, we obtain kh = [4, 1, 0, 2]
T.
III) EPC: Substituting khm ∀m into (1) gives shm(t). Then,
further substituting shm(t) and φ into (14), the EPC-processed
waveform is obtain, i.e., s˜hm(t).
IV) RSR: Initialize the coefficients caused by RSR as
bhm = 1 ∀m. Given Q = 1, a random integer is generated to
be the index of RSR antenna. Take I0 = 0 for the index.
Enforcing constraint (28), we set bh(I0+M/2) = −1, since
khI0 > kh(I0+M/2). By multiplying bhm to s˜hm(t), RSR-
processed signal s˘hm(t) = bhms˜hm(t) is obtained. Then, radar
radiates s˘hm(t) from antenna m in RF band.
V) HFCS Decoding at Bob: The baseband signal received
at Bob, i.e., y˘h(i), is shown in Fig. 4. We see that the useful
signal is corrupted in noises in the time domain. Taking a 200-
point DFT leads to the frequency-domain signal as done in (4),
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Fig. 4. Signals received by Bob and Eve in time and frequency domains.
we obtain Y˘h(l), whose ammplitude is shown in Fig. 4
1. We
see four peaks of |Y˘h(l)| and their indexes are l∗0 = 0, l∗1 =
20, l∗2 = 40 and l
∗
3 = 80. Substituting l
∗
m into (6), we obtain
K̂h = {0, 1, 2, 4}, where xˆ denotes an estimate of x. Looking
up K̂h in C1 gives its index in the set which is one in this
example. Converting one to E1 bits, the HFCS sub-symbol is
decoded as “01”.
VI) RSR Removal at Bob: Next, we perform Algorithm
2 to remove RSR for Bob. Collecting Y˘h(l
∗
m) for m =
0, 1, · · · , 4, we obtain y˘h = [−0.3416− 1.0724j,−0.9379 +
0.0325j, 0.9413 − 0.1311j, 0.0198 − 0.9291j]T with AWGNs
added. Running Step 2 of Algorithm 2 leads to
Y˘h =

0 1.5764 2.5319 0.1511
1.5764 0 3.5584 1.8420
2.5319 2.5584 0 1.4860
0.1511 1.8420 1.4860 0

Then Step 3 gives ymin = [0.1511, 1.5764, 1.4860, 0.1511]
T
and d = [3, 0, 3, 0]T. Sorting ymin in Step 4 leads to d1 =
[0, 3, 2, 1]T. This further results in i = 0 and i′ = 3 in Step 6
of Algorithm 2. By comparing l0/r and l3/r in Step 7, RSR
is detected on [y˘h]0 and removed by reversing the sign of
[y˘h]0. The output of Algorithm 2 is the RSR-removed signal,
i.e., y˜h = [0.3416 + 1.0724j,−0.9379 + 0.0325j, 0.9413 −
0.1311j, 0.0198− 0.9291j]T.
VII) HFPS Decoding at Bob: With y˜h obtained, Algorithm
1 is performed to decode HFPS sub-symbol. Substituting y˜h
in Step 2 gives ~ω = [3.0695,−1.4878, 1.5972, 0.1131]T. In
Step 3, the angles in ~ω are revised, leading to
~ω = [−3.2137,−1.4878,−4.6859,−6.1701]T.
Sorting the revised ~ω gives the index vector i = [1, 0, 2, 3]T.
Comparing ‖e−j6.1701− 1‖2 = 0.1130 and ‖e−j1.4878− 1‖2 =
1.3543 in Step 5, we know that zigzag has affected ~ω. Thus,
i is circularly shifted once, which gives i = [3, 1, 0, 2]T. Step
6 constructs Ph based on i, as given by
Ph =

0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
 .
Substituting Ph in (11), we obtain kˆh = [4, 1, 0, 2]
T. Looking
up kˆh in C2 gives its index in the set which is three in this
1Note that the time- and frequency-domain signals received by Eve are also
provided in Fig. 4 for comparison. We clearly see four peaks in the frequency
spectrum of Eve and the peaks are located at the same discrete frequencies
as those of Bob. Thus, Eve detects the same hopping frequencies as Bob.
example. Converting decimal 3 to E2(= 4) bits, the HFPS sub-
symbol is decoded as “0011”. Both sub-symbols are correctly
decoded at Bob applying the proposed methods.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, simulation results are presented to validate
the proposed design. Unless otherwise specified, the FH-
MIMO radar is configured as: M = 4, Q = M2 , K = 20,
H = 15, B = 100 MHz, T = 1 µs and L = 200
(based on the sampling frequency of 2B); and the commu-
nication parameters are: φ ∼ U[−90◦,90◦], θ ∼ U[−90◦,90◦],
α = ejx (x ∼ U[0,2π]) and β = ejy (y ∼ U[0,2π]). Here, U[·,·]
stands for the uniform distribution in the subscript region.
Throughout simulation, Eve knows the AoD of Bob, if not
otherwise specified. The time-domain SNR at Bob is defined
based on (3), as given by γB =
M|β|2
σ2
ξ
, where σ2ξ is the noise
power of ξ(i). Based on (9), the decoding SNR at Bob is
LγB, where the L times improvement is brought by DFT; see
(4). Likewise, the time-domain and decoding SNRs at Eve are
given by γE =
M|α|2
σ2z
and LγE, respectively, where σ
2
z/L is the
noise power of Z(l) given in (7). When presenting decoding
performance, we use Eb/N0, defined as energy per bit to noise
power density ratio, i.e.,
Eb/N0 = LγBBT/E, (30)
where E is the number of bits conveyed per radar hop and γB
can be replaced with γE to obtain Eb/N0 for Eve.
The labels used in the figures are interpreted as follows,
• “Bob-proposed”: indicates that EPC and RSR are per-
formed at radar, and Algorithms 1 and 2 at Bob;
• “Bob-without RSR”: indicates that EPC and Algorithm
1 are performed at radar and Bob, respectively. This is
the lower bound of “Bob-proposed” given the absence of
RSR removal error caused by running Algorithm 2;
• “Eve”: indicates that EPC and RSR are performed at radar
and (18) is solved for HFPS decoding at Eve;
• “Eve-without Bob’s AoD”: is the same as above except
the AoD of Bob is unavailable at Eve;
• “Eve-without RSR”: is the same as “Eve” except RSR is
not performed at radar. This also acts as a performance
indicator of a general HFPS decoding without conducting
the proposed EPC and RSR at radar;
• “Bob/Eve-HFCS”: indicates that only HFCS is used for
FH-MIMO DFRC, as done in the state of the art [22].
Fig. 5 compares the SERs achieved by Bob and Eve as
Eb/N0 increases. From the curves labeled “Bob-proposed”
and “Eve” in Fig. 5, we see that Bob has a decreasing SER
against Eb/N0 and Eve has a close-to-one SER over the
same region of Eb/N0. This demonstrates the substantially
high communication secrecy achieved by the proposed design.
Comparing the curves labeled “Bob-proposed” and “HFCS”
in Fig. 5, we see the improvement of the proposed scheme
over HFCS [22]. In particular, the proposed design reduces
SER by more than one order of magnitude at Eb/N0= 23
dB. This improvement owes to: (i) the use of HFPS which
increases the number of bits conveyed per radar hop; (ii) the
proposed EPC which solves the AoD-dependent issue of HFPS
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Fig. 5. SER against Eb/N0, where γB and γE are both in [−10,−2] dB.
The radar configuration leads to ⌊log2 C
M
K ⌋ = 12 bits conveyed by HFCS
sub-symbol and ⌊log2M !⌋ = 4 bits by HFPS. Substituting E = 12+4 into
(30) gives the Eb/N0 region in the figure. The zoomed-in sub-figure helps
see the SER of Eve more clearly.
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Fig. 6. SER against Eb/N0, where M = 4, 6 and 8 for curves without
markers, with dots and with crosses, respectively, and Q = M
2
∀M . γB ∈
[−10,−2] dB is set for M = 4 and increased by 4 dB and 8 dB for M = 6
and 8, respectively; the same for γE. The zoomed-in sub-figure helps see the
SER of Eve more clearly.
decoding; see the curves “Bob-proposed” (with EPC) versus
“Eve-without RSR” (suffering from the issue); and (iii) the
newly designed Algorithm 2 which accurately removes RSR
for Bob, c.f., the almost overlapping curves labeled as “Bob-
proposed” and “Bob-without RSR”.
We see from Fig. 5 that solely using HFCS leads to identical
SER performance of Bob and Eve, which highlights the
necessity and significance of our design of enhancing physical
layer security. From the three curves related to Eve in Fig.
5, we see three levels of performance degradation at Eve
incurred by the proposed design. First, by introducing HFPS,
the decoding of Eve suffers from an AoD-dependent issue,
leading to the convergence of an SER close to 0.1. Second, by
introducing EPC, the decoding at Eve substantially degrades
without the AoD of Eve, increasing the converging SER to
about 0.9. Third, with RSR performed, the HFPS decoding
at Eve is completely incapacitated, incurring SER larger than
0.99 across the whole region of Eb/N0.
Fig. 6 compares the SER performance achieved under
different values of M . Corresponding to M = 4, 6 and 8,
the numbers of bits conveyed by HFPS are 4, 9 and 15, and
those by HFCS are 12, 15 and 16, respectively. Comparing the
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Fig. 7. SER achieved by “Bob-proposed” as Eb/N0 increases, whereM = 6,
Q takes 1 to 3, the dash-dotted curves use the y-axis on the right, and both
γB and γE are set in [−6, 2] dB.
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Fig. 8. SER against spatial angle from −90◦ to 90◦ with a grid of 0.5◦,
where φ = −30◦ and 60◦ are observed, M = 6, Q = 3, and γB = −3 dB.
curves labeled as “Bob-without RSR” and “HFCS”, we see
that the increased bits per hop earned by the proposed scheme
has the potential of improving SER performance progressively
as M increases. We also see from that the gap between the
actual SER achieved by our design (“Bob-proposed”) and the
bound (“Bob-without RSR”) increases with M , rendering the
proposed HFPS plus HFCS slightly worse than the sole HFCS
in high Eb/N0 regions. As expected, this is the price of the
substantially high communication secrecy; see the zoomed-in
sub-figures. It is noteworthy that, albeit the slight performance
loss caused by Algorithm 2, the achievable SER sill improves
with Eb/N0, implying that the loss is compensable. In con-
trast, the converging SER at Eve is irrecoverable.
Fig. 7 observes the impact of Q on the proposed design.
We see that the achievable SER increases negligibly with Q.
This validates the robustness of the newly designed Algorithm
2 against Q. We also see that the SER of Eve approaches one
tightly even at Q = 1 and is closer to one as Q increases.
This validates our analysis in Appendix B; specifically, the
SER convergence at Eve happens for sure, as the number of
permutation matrices leading to error HFPS decoding is larger
than one at Q = 1 and increases with Q.
Fig. 8 observes the SER performance against the spatial
angle. From “Bob-proposed”, we see that the proposed scheme
can achieve high secrecy almost omnidirectionally. Except at
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Fig. 9. Impact of the proposed baseband waveform processing on radar
detection, where (a) RAFs under three groups of independently and randomly
generated hopping frequencies; (b) RAFs after performing HFPS, EPC and
RSR on the waveform generated for Fig. 9(a); and (c) SIR against number
of targets. Figs. 9(a) and 9(b) take M = 8. In 9(c), dotted curves are based
on conventional FH-MIMO radar waveform with randomly generated hopping
frequencies, dash curves are based on HFCS, and solid curves are based on all
the proposed processing; and square, triangle and cross markers correspond
to M = 4, 6 and 8, respectively.
the AoD of Bob, the SERs at all the other spatial angles ap-
proach one tightly. We also see that the SERs of Bob achieved
at different AoDs are similar. This owes to the proposed
EPC which removes the AoD-dependence for Bob. From the
curve “Eve-without RSR”, we see the reduced physical layer
enhancement brought by EPC if the AoD of Bob is known
to Eve. Moreover, from the curve “HFCS”, we see that a
uniform SER performance is achieved over the whole angular
region. This again demonstrates that solely using HFCS for
FH-MIMO DFRC is highly prone to eavesdropping.
Last but not least, we illustrate the impact of the proposed
waveform processing on FH-MIMO radar performance. Fig.
9(a) is provided to illustrate the impact of HFCS on radar
ranging performance. We see that the mainlobes and mainlobe-
to-sidelobe ratios (MSRs) under three realizations are almost
identical. We also see that the periodicity of sidelobe spikes
is the same for different random sets of hopping frequencies.
From Fig. 9(b), we see that the proposed waveform processing
suppresses the sidelobe spikes, improving the minimum MSR
by more than 10 dB. From Fig. 9(c), we see that the im-
provement on MSR increases SIR of radar detection by up
to 4 dB at M = 8. We also see that, despite the values
of M , the proposed processing leads to similar SIRs. We
further see that HFCS waveform achieves the same SIR as the
conventional FH-MIMO radar waveform. These observations
of Fig. 9 validate our analysis in Section IV-C.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a secure and high-speed FH-MIMO DFRC
system is developed. This is achieved by introducing HFPS
constellations to fully exploit information embedding capa-
bility embodied in hopping frequencies. This is also ac-
complished by a new EPC processing which addresses the
AoD-dependent issue for Bob and substantially enhances the
physical layer security if the AoD of Bob is unknown to Eve.
This is further fulfilled by the proposed RSR which scrambles
constellations almost omnidirectionally and forces the SER
of Eve, even knowing the AoD of Bob, into converging
to one. Validated by simulations, our new design achieves
substantially high secrecy, increases data rate and improves
SIR of radar detection. As a future work, we will introduce
multi-antenna receiver for Bob and develop new methods to
further improve decoding performance.
APPENDIX
A. Calculation of (4)
Based on (3), the L-point DFT of the signal component in
yh(i), denoted by Y
s
h (l), can be calculated as
Y sh (l) = β
M−1∑
m=0
e−jmuφ
1
L
L−1∑
i=0
ej2πrikhm/Le−j
2pili
L
= β
M−1∑
m=0
e−jmuφ
sin
(
πL
(
l−rkhm
L
))
L sin
(
π
(
l−rkhm
L
))e−j2π L−12 ( l−rkhmL ).
From the above result, we see that sin
(
πL
(
l−rkhm
L
))
is
always zero due to the integer r; see (2). This indicates that
Y sh (l) is only non-zero when the denominator equals to zero,
i.e., sin
(
π
(
l−rkhm
L
))
= 0. The sine function only takes zero
provided
(
rkhm+l
L
)
is an integer which leads to l = rkhm.
From the above analysis, Y sh (l) only takes non-zero values at
l = rkhm. Using the Dirac function, Y
s
h (l) is written as in (4).
B. Proof of Proposition 1
We first illustrate that fℜb (P) conforms to a normal distri-
bution. Denote PTPh in (22) as P˘ and rewrite f
ℜ
b (P) as
fℜb (P) = ℜ
{
aHθφ
(
P˘bh ⊙ P˘aθφ
)}
= ℜ
{
M−1∑
m=0
b˘hme
j∆hm
}
,
where b˘hm = [P˘bh]m and ∆hm is the difference between the
phases of [aθφ]m and [P˘aθφ]m, i.e.,
∆hm = m(2π/M + uθφ)− arg
{
[P˘aθφ]m
}
∀m, (31)
where aθφ is given in (18) and uθφ = uθ−uφ. Based on (20),
we have
P{b˘hm = 1} = (M −Q)/M ; P{b˘hm = −1} = Q/M. (32)
As b˘hm (m = 0, 1, · · · ,M − 1) are independent Bernoulli-
like variables, a weighted sum of them with constant-modulus
weights, i.e.,
∑M−1
m=0 b˘hme
j∆hm , approaches to a normally
distributed variable according to the central limit theorem [27].
As the real part of a complex normal variable, fℜb (P) also
conforms to a normal distribution, i.e., fℜb (P) ∼ N (µf , σ2f ).
We proceed to calculate the parameters of fℜb (P). Taking
the expectation of fℜb (P) leads to
µf = E
{
fℜb (P)
}
= ℜ
{
M−1∑
m=0
E
{
b˘hm
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
µf1
E
{
ej∆hm
}︸ ︷︷ ︸
µf2
}
, (33)
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where the randomness in ej∆hm is caused by P˘; see (31).
Based on (32), we can calculate µf1 as
µf1 =
(
1× M −Q
M
+ (−1)× Q
M
)
=
M − 2Q
M
. (34)
Given a large sample set of P˘, the second term on the RHS
of (31) has a uniformly distributed angle, i.e.,
P
{
arg
{
[P˘aθφ]m
}
= m′
(
uθφ +
2π
M
)}
=
1
M
∀m′ ≤M − 1.
Based on the above PDF and (31), µf2 can be calculated as
µf2 = e
jm
(
uθφ+
2pi
M
) M−1∑
m′=0
e−jm
′
(
uθφ+
2pi
M
)
M
 (35)
= ejm
(
uθφ+
2pi
M
)
× e
−jM−12
(
uθφ+
2pi
M
)
M
sin
(
M
(
uθφ+
2pi
M
)
2
)
sin
((
uθφ+
2pi
M
)
2
) .
Substituting (34) and (35) into (33) and after some manipula-
tions, we obtain
µf = ℜ

M − 2Q
M2
sin2
(
M
(
uθφ+
2pi
M
)
2
)
sin2
((
uθφ+
2pi
M
)
2
)
 , (36)
which leads to (24).
Next, we calculate the variance of fℜb (P). Given that the
variance of the real part of a complex Gaussian-distributed
variable is half the full variance, we calculate σ2f as in (37),
where
(a)
= is achieved based on two facts. First, the expectations
of products between different b˘hm are zero due to their mu-
tual independence. Second, E
{∑M−1
m=0 b˘hme
−j∆hm
}
= µf is
plugged in, since E
{∑M−1
m=0 b˘hme
−j∆hm
}
, calculated within
the curly brackets in (36), is already a real value.
We proceed to investigate the impact of the normally
distributed fℜb (P) on HFPS decoding at Eve. Referring to
(18), an error HFPS decoding happens at Eve when solving
(18) returns a P satisfying the following event
E : fℜb (P) > fℜb (Ph) = (M − 2Q) ∀P 6= Ph. (38)
Therefore, to prove that RSR causes the convergence of SER
of Eve to one, we turn to validating there is always P making
event (38) happen.
Given the normal distribution fℜb (P) ∼ N (µf , σ2f ), the
probability of event E can be expressed using the comple-
mentary error function, i.e.,
P{E} = erfc {h(µf , Q)}
2
, s.t. h(µf , Q) =
(M − 2Q)− µf√
M − µ2f
,
where σf given in (24) has been plugged in. As illustrated
in Appendix C, h(µf , Q) is a non-increasing function of
µf ∈ [0,M − 2Q]. In addition, it can be readily validated that
h(µf , Q) is also a decreasing function of Q. Therefore, given
the decreasing monotonicity of erfc{·} against its argument,
P{E} is maximized by taking µf = 0 and Q = 1. This gives
P{E} ≥ 12erfc
{
(M−2)√
M
}
. Then the number of P making E
happen, denoted by NP, satisfies
NP = P{E} ×M ! ≥ M !
2
erfc
{
(M − 2)√
M
}
, (39)
where M ! is the number of all possible permutation matrices
in PEve; see (18). As shown in Fig. 10, NP is a non-decreasing
function of M and the lower bound of NP is one at the
minimum M = 2. This confirms the existence of P causing
(38) for any values of M(≥ 2) and hence the convergence of
the SER to one at Eve.
Before concluding the proof, we explain the angular region
confinement in (23). From (37), we see that to ensure a non-
negative variance,M−µ2f ≥ 0 is required. By plugging (36) in
the inequality, a region of uθφ can be obtained. Unfortunately,
analytical expression for the region is unavailable, due to the
discrete sinc function in (36). Nevertheless, it can be inferred
that uθφ leading to M − µ2f < 0 can only be located in the
mainlobe of the sinc function in (36). This is because µ2f is
upper bounded by
16(M−2Q)2
81π4 in the sidelobe regions
2, i.e.,
0 ≤ uθφ ≤ 2π(M−2)M . For tractability, we use this region in
Proposition 1, even though the actual region is slightly larger,
as shown in Fig. 3.
C. Monotonicity of h(µf , Q)
Taking the first partial derivative of h(µf , Q) against µf ,
after lengthy yet straightforward manipulations, leads to
∂h(µf , Q)
∂µf
=
µf (M − 2Q)−M
(M − µ2f )
3
2
.
As σ2f given in (37) is non-negative, we have M ≥ µ2f . Based
on (36), we have µf ≤ (M −2Q). Thus, the numerator of the
above first partial derivative is non-positive. That is, h(µf , Q)
is a non-increasing function of µf .
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